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Theories	of	value	and	ultimate	standards	in	Sraffa’s	notes	of	summer	1927		Saverio	M.	Fratini	
Roma	Tre	University			
Abstract	The	 group	 of	 manuscripts	 titled	 ‘Notes/London,	 Summer	 1927/Physical	 real	 costs,	 etc.’	(D3/12/3)	 is	 recognized	 as	 extremely	 important	 for	 the	 reconstruction	 of	 the	 evolution	 of	Sraffa’s	thought	after	the	articles	published	in	1925	and	1926.	The	present	paper	is	aimed	at	analysing	some	relevant	passages	and	ideas	expressed	by	Sraffa	in	those	manuscripts.	We	shall	focus,	in	particular,	on	Sraffa’s	arguments	about	the	existence	of	two	different	theories	of	value,	with	different	aims:	one	aimed	at	determining	the	value	of	large	aggregates	of	 commodities,	 such	 as	 the	 national	 product,	 the	 necessary	 consumption	 and	 the	 social	surplus,	and	the	other	aimed	at	determining	the	price	of	a	single	commodity,	separately	from	the	others.	In	Sraffa’s	view,	if	the	values	of	many	commodities	are	to	be	determined	simultaneously,	then	the	theory	cannot	dispense	with	an	ultimate	standard	of	value.	That	idea	led	Sraffa	toward	the	conception	(or	the	rediscovery)	of	the	physical	real	cost.		
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1.	Introduction		At	 the	 end	 of	 May	 1927,	 Sraffa	 was	 appointed	 ‘Lecturer	 in	 Economics’	 by	 the	 Faculty	 of	Economics	of	the	University	of	Cambridge.	In	July	of	the	same	year	he	moved	to	England	and	the	beginning	of	his	course	on	Advanced	Theory	of	Value	was	scheduled	for	October.	During	the	 summer,	 Sraffa	 began	 preparing	 his	 lectures,	 which,	 however,	 proved	 to	 be	 more	complicated	than	expected,	so	the	course	was	postponed	by	one	year.1	Among	Sraffa’s	manuscripts,	there	is	a	group	of	notes	‒	usually	called	‘pre-lectures’	‒	that	refers	 specifically	 to	 this	 period.	 It	 is	 a	 folder	 with	 about	 70	 pages	 titled:	 ‘Notes/London,	Summer	 1927/Physical	 real	 costs,	 etc.’	 (Sraffa	 papers:	 D3/12/3).	 According	 to	 Garegnani’s	reconstruction	(2005),	this	set	of	manuscripts	is	very	important	for	interpreting	the	evolution	
																																																								1	Sraffa	delivered	the	course	at	Cambridge	in	the	academic	years	1928–29,	1929–30	and	1930–31.	For	an	in-depth	analysis	of	his	lectures,	see	Signorino	(2005)	and	Trezzini	(2018a).	
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of	Sraffa’s	thought.	Between	1927	and	1928,	as	Garegnani	showed,	a	turning	point	took	place	in	Sraffa’s	interpretation	of	the	classical	theory	of	value.	In	particular,	in	his	articles	of	1925	and	1926,	 Sraffa	 essentially	 accepted	Marshall’s	 supply-and-demand	 approach	 and,	 accordingly,	believed	that	‘the	old	and	now	obsolete	theory	which	makes	[value]	dependent	on	the	cost	of	production’	(Sraffa	1926:	541)	‒	i.e.	the	classical	theory	‒	rested	on	the	assumption	of	constant	returns	to	scale.	This	erroneous	belief	‒	as	stressed	by	Garegnani	‒	was	instead	absent	in	the	text	of	 the	 lectures	delivered	from	October	1928,	proving	that	a	change	occurred	 in	Sraffa’s	theoretical	and	interpretative	position	in	the	meanwhile.	The	present	paper	is	largely	based	on	this	reconstruction	and	is	aimed	at	investigating	some	issues	that	Garegnani,	in	wanting	to	provide	an	overall	view	of	the	evolution	of	Sraffa’s	thought,	did	not	examine	 in	detail.	They	 concern,	 in	particular,	 Sraffa’s	 identification	of	 two	different	 theories	 of	 value,	 with	 different	 aims.	 The	 first,	 that	 of	 Ricardo,	 was	 aimed	 at	determining	 the	 value	 of	 large	 aggregates	of	 commodities.	The	 second,	Marshall’s	 one,	was	instead	built	to	determine	the	price	of	each	single	commodity	separately.	According	to	Sraffa,	in	order	to	restore	Ricardo’s	approach,	in	contrast	to	what	Marshall	wrote,	an	ultimate	standard	of	 value	was	 required.	 As	we	 shall	 see,	 that	 idea	 led	 Sraffa	 toward	 the	 conception	 (or	 the	rediscovery)	of	the	physical	real	cost	‒	namely	the	amount	of	commodity	necessary	to	enable	production	‒	and	it	was	the	first	step	on	his	path	toward	the	price	equations.			
2.	Ricardo	and	Marshall:	two	theories	of	value		Despite	Marshall’s	 attempt	‒	 in	Appendix	 I	of	 his	Principles	 (Marshall	1920:	813‒821)	‒	 to	mend	Jevons’	rift	between	Ricardo’s	theory	of	value	and	the	marginalist	approach,	Sraffa,	in	the	
pre-lectures,	recognized	that	a	deep	transformation	occurred	in	both	the	role	and	the	meaning	of	the	theory	of	value.	As	he	wrote	in	a	possible	‘general	scheme’	of	his	lectures:		General	Scheme	The	adventures	of	the	Theory	of	Value.	The	problems	which	were	prominent	in	the	mind	of	 the	older	economists	were	the	national	wealth,	and	later	 its	distribution.	Ricardo’s	definition	of	Political	Economy.2	How	 this	was	 later	 reversed	 to	 the	 consideration	of	
																																																								2	Here	Sraffa	refers	(cf.	Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	8‒9)	to	the	definition	of	Political	Economy	given	by	Ricardo	in	a	letter	he	wrote	to	Malthus	(9	October	1820):	Political	Economy	you	think	is	an	enquiry	into	the	nature	and	causes	of	wealth	‒	I	think	it	should	rather	be	called	an	enquiry	into	the	laws	which	determine	the	division	of	the	produce	of	industry	amongst	the	classes	who	concur	in	its	formation.	(Works,	vol.	VIII:	278).	
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technique	of	price-fixing	and	what	is	distribution	regarded	as	price-fixing	of	factors	of	production.	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	5)		According	to	Sraffa,	the	classical	economists	and	the	modern	scholars	approached	the	theory	of	value	in	two	different	ways.	The	classical	economists	were	mainly	interested	in	the	determination	of	 the	national	wealth	and	 its	distribution	among	social	 classes.	Accordingly,	they	were	interested	in	the	valuation	of	groups	of	commodities:	national	product,	necessary	consumption,	surplus.	By	contrast,	in	the	modern	marginalist	approach,	income	distribution	is	not	 a	 social	 but	 rather	 a	 market	 phenomenon:	 wage	 rate,	 interest	 rate	 and	 rent	 rate	 are	understood	as	the	prices	of	the	factors	of	production	‒	labour,	capital	and	land.	The	marginalist	economists	wanted	to	apply	the	same	principle,	namely	the	equilibrium	between	supply	and	demand,	to	the	determination	of	both	the	price	of	each	commodity	and	the	price	of	each	factor.	In	particular,	focussing	on	the	problems	in	view	of	which	the	theory	of	value	was	worked	out,	Sraffa	distinguished	three	periods	or	phases:		The	very	concept	of	«theory	of	value»	has	undergone	a	deep	transformation,	according	to	the	problem	which	most	intensely	attracted	in	each	period	the	interest	of	economists.	Accordingly,	widely	different	things	are	covered	by	the	same	expression.	We	may,	for	the	purpose	in	hand,	distinguish	three	conceptions	corresponding	to	three	well-defined	periods.	I	Causes	and	nature	of	wealth	(1776–1820)	II	Distribution	of	product	amongst	classes	(1820–1870)	III	Determination	of	price	of	single	commodities	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	13)		Adam	Smith,	with	his	Inquiry	into	the	Nature	and	Causes	of	the	Wealth	of	Nations	‒	whose	first	edition	was	published	in	1776	‒	can	be	surely	regarded	as	the	most	prominent	figure	of	the	first	period.	For	the	second	and	the	third	period	we	can	make	reference	to	Ricardo	and	Marshall,	respectively.	The	difference	between	Ricardo’s	and	Marshall’s	approach	to	the	theory	of	value	is	so	neat	that	the	path	followed	by	the	former	cannot	be	considered	a	solution	to	the	problem	faced	by	the	latter	and	vice	versa.	On	the	one	hand,	 the	labour	theory	of	value,	being	designed	for	determining	 the	 relative	 value	 of	 large	 aggregates	 of	 commodities,	 is	 subject	 to	 notable	exceptions	when	the	relative	price	of	two	commodities	is	to	be	determined.	Ricardo	was	very	well	 aware	 of	 these	 limitations,	 as	 emerges,	 for	 instance,	 from	his	 letters	 to	McCulloch	 and	Malthus.3	On	the	other	hand,	Marshall’s	partial	equilibrium	approach	is	crucially	based	on	the																																																									3	In	Ricardo’s	analysis,	capital	is	divided	into	two	parts:	circulating	capital,	which	essentially	consists	of	wages	paid	in	advance,	and	fixed	capital,	which	corresponds	to	the	value	of	the	durable	capital	goods	employed.	The	amount	of	circulating	capital	invested	is	considered	proportional	to	the	employment	of	 labour.	Therefore,	 if	circulating	
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ceteris	 paribus	 assumption	 ‒	 i.e.	 that	 the	 equilibrium	 on	 a	 single	 market	 is	 determined	considering	all	the	other	prices	and	quantities	as	already	fixed.	It	is,	therefore,	a	methodology	that	 can	 hardly	 be	 extended	 to	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 relative	 values	 of	 aggregates	 of	commodities.	Hence,	Sraffa	wrote:		Considering	the	wide	differences	between	the	two	theories	of	value	(which,	by	the	way,	far	 from	 being	 contradictory,	 simply	 are	 attempts	 to	 solve	 altogether	 different	questions)	it	would	be	convenient	to	designate	them	by	different	names.	The	older	one	has	a	 right	of	priority	 to	 the	name	 theory	of	 value.	Therefore	 the	 second	one	 should	change:	when	there	is	a	danger	of	ambiguity	it	will	be	convenient	to	describe	it	as	the	theory	of	prices.	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	20)			
3.	Labour,	utility	and	the	law	of	supply	and	demand		In	the	second	half	of	the	nineteenth	century,	the	class	conflict	in	Europe	was	growing.	Three	dates	can	be	considered	particularly	representative	of	what	was	happening	at	that	time.	The	first	meeting	of	the	International	Workingmen’s	Association	was	held	in	London	in	1864.	The	first	volume	of	Marx’s	Das	Kapital	was	published	in	Germany	in	1867.	In	1871,	in	France,	there	was	the	bloody	experience	of	the	Paris	Commune.	It	became	clear	that	socialism	was	not	just	an	idea,	but	was	becoming	a	real	danger	for	the	ruling	classes.	
																																																								and	fixed	capital	are	in	the	same	proportion	in	every	sector,	then	the	proportion	of	profits	to	labour	is	the	same	in	every	sector	and	the	labour	theory	of	value	holds.	However,	significant	deviations	of	the	circulating	to	fixed	capital	ratio	 among	 sectors	 inevitably	 lead	 to	 deviations	 of	 the	 relative	 value	 from	 the	 relative	 quantities	 of	 labour	embodied.	As	Sraffa	argued	in	his	Introduction	to	the	Principles	(Works,	vol.	I:	xxxix‒xl),	some	of	Ricardo’s	letters	highlight	his	position,	although	this	emerges	in	the	Principles	as	well.	In	particular,	in	a	letter	to	McCulloch	on	13 June 1820, 
Ricardo wrote:	I	 sometimes	 think	 that	 if	 I	 were	 to	write	 the	 chapter	 on	 value	 again	which	 is	 in	my	 book,	 I	 should	acknowledge	 that	 the	 relative	 value	 of	 commodities	was	 regulated	 by	 two	 causes	 instead	 of	 by	 one,	namely,	by	the	relative	quantity	of	labour	necessary	to	produce	the	commodities	in	question,	and	by	the	rate	of	profit	for	the	time	that	the	capital	remained	dormant,	and	until	the	commodities	were	brought	to	market.	(Works,	vol.	VIII:	194)	and,	in	a	letter	to	Malthus	on	9 October 1820:	You	say	that	my	proposition	“that	with	few	exceptions	the	quantity	of	labour	employed	on	commodities	determines	the	rate	at	which	they	will	exchange	for	each	other,	is	not	well	founded”.	I	acknowledge	that	it	is	not	rigidly	true,	but	I	say	that	it	is	the	nearest	approximation	to	truth,	as	a	rule	for	measuring	relative	value,	of	any	I	have	ever	heard.	(Works,	vol.	VIII:	279)	When	 the	 labour	 theory	 of	 value	 is	 used	 for	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 relative	 value	 of	 aggregates	 of	commodities,	the	approximation	is	even	better	since	deviations	with	an	opposite	sign	may	compensate	each	other.	But,	clearly,	there	are	problems	‒	later	highlighted	by	Marx	‒	when	it	is	used	for	the	determination	of	the	relative	price	of	single	commodities.	
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It	was	in	this	scenario	that	the	marginalist	theory	of	value	and	distribution	was	born	and	spread	quite	rapidly	as	a	sort	of	 theoretical	reply	to	socialism.4	Specifically,	 it	 is	clear	 in	 the	words	of	Jevons,	Menger	and	the	other	founders	of	this	approach	that	the	marginalist	theory	was	intended	as	a	criticism	of	the	labour	theory	of	value	and,	at	least	implicitly,	as	a	reaction	to	the	radical	conclusions	that	the	Ricardian	socialists	were	drawing	from	it.5	As	Jevons	wrote,	the	theory	of	value	based	on	marginal	utility	is	aimed	at	displacing	Ricardo’s	labour	theory	of	value:		Repeated	reflections	and	inquiry	have	led	me	to	the	somewhat	novel	opinion,	that	value	
depends	 entirely	 upon	 utility.	 Prevailing	 opinions	make	 labour	 rather	 than	 utility	 the	origin	of	value;	and	there	are	even	those	who	distinctly	assert	that	labour	is	the	cause	of	value.	I	show,	on	the	contrary,	that	we	have	only	to	trace	out	carefully	the	natural	laws	of	the	variation	of	utility	[…]	in	order	to	arrive	at	a	satisfactory	theory	of	exchange,	of	which	the	ordinary	laws	of	supply	and	demand	are	a	necessary	consequence.	 (Jevons	1888:	1,	2;	emphasis	in	the	original)		Jevons’	attack	on	Ricardo’s	theory	was	very	strong.	He	wrote	that	‘that	able	but	wrong-headed	man,	David	Ricardo,	shunted	the	car	of	Economic	science	on	to	a	wrong	line’	(Jevons	1888:	l).	Then,	when	Marshall,	a	 few	years	 later,	 tried	to	present	 the	modern	approach	as	a	development	of	the	classical	theory	of	Smith	and	Ricardo	‒	‘a	neoclassical	theory’,	as	Veblen	called	it	‒	he	had	to	put	the	conflict	between	Jevons	and	Ricardo	in	different	terms.	According	 to	 Marshall,	 there	 are	 two	 standards	 of	 value:	 utility	 and	 cost.6	 Jevons	emphasized	the	role	of	the	former	and	Ricardo	that	of	the	latter,	but	neither	of	them	was	right	since	neither	utility	nor	cost	are	ultimate	determinants	of	value:		There	are	 few	writers	of	modern	times	who	have	approached	as	near	to	 the	brilliant	originality	of	Ricardo	as	Jevons	has	done.	But	he	appears	to	have	judged	both	Ricardo	and	Mill	harshly,	and	to	have	attributed	to	them	doctrines	narrower	and	less	scientific	than	 those	which	 they	 really	held.	And	his	desire	 to	emphasize	an	aspect	of	 value	 to	which	 they	 had	 given	 insufficient	 prominence	 was	 probably	 in	 some	 measure	accountable	 for	 his	 saying,	 ‘Repeated	 reflection	 and	 inquiry	 have	 led	 me	 to	 the	somewhat	novel	opinion	that	value	depends	entirely	upon	utility’	 (Theory,	p.	1).	This																																																									4	On	the	rising	of	the	marginalist	approach,	cf.	Campus	(1987).	As	for	the	development	of	the	marginalist	theory	as	a	 reaction	 to	socialism,	cf.	 in	particular	Fetter	 (1923)	and	Clark	 (1924).	See	also	Fratini	 (2018)	 for	Sraffa’s	standpoint	on	that.	5	As	is	known,	the	Ricardian	socialists	associated	the	validity	of	the	labour	theory	of	value	with	the	idea	that	labour	is	the	only	productive	agent.	In	their	view,	since	the	entire	output	comes	from	labour,	the	entire	output	must	go	to	workers.	Therefore,	when	the	wage	rate	allows	the	workers	to	buy	commodities	that	embody	less	than	one	unit	of	labour,	according	to	the	Ricardian	socialists	this	is	an	‘unequal	exchange’.	Even	Marx	‒	who	wrote	pages	of	harsh	criticism	against	the	Ricardian	socialists	‒	was	initially	perceived	by	various	authors	as	a	Ricardian	socialist.	Sraffa,	however,	was	very	clear	that	he	was	not:	Marx’s	surplus	value	does	not	depend	upon	labour	being	the	only	cause,	or	even	one	cause	of	value,	but	to	its	being	proportional	to	value	[…].	Ludicrous	belief	that	Marx	says	«labour	is	the	only	cause	of	value,	therefore	all	value	must	go	to	labour».	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	7)	6	For	an	in-depth	analysis	of	the	cost-utility	controversy	and	Marshall’s	theory	of	value,	cf.	Campus	(2000).	
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statement	seems	to	be	no	less	one-sided	and	fragmentary,	and	much	more	misleading,	than	that	into	which	Ricardo	often	glided	with	careless	brevity,	as	to	the	dependence	of	value	on	cost	of	production;	but	which	he	never	regarded	as	more	than	a	part	of	a	larger	doctrine,	the	rest	of	which	he	had	tried	to	explain.	(Marshall	1920:	817)		In	 Marshall’s	 theory,	 the	 cost	 of	 production	 and	 the	 marginal	 utility	 are	 both	 involved	 as	component	parts	of	the	‘law	of	supply	and	demand’,	which	is	the	mechanism	by	which	prices	are	determined:		The	 ‘cost	 of	 production	 principle’	 and	 the	 ‘final	 utility’	 principle	 are	 undoubtedly	component	parts	of	the	one	all-ruling	law	of	supply	and	demand;	each	may	be	compared	to	one	blade	of	a	pair	of	scissors.	When	one	blade	is	held	still,	and	the	cutting	is	effected	by	moving	the	other,	we	may	say	with	careless	brevity	that	the	cutting	is	done	by	the	second;	but	 the	statement	 is	not	one	to	be	made	formally,	and	defended	deliberately.	(Marshall	1920:	820)		As	for	the	cost	of	production	‒	in	Marshall’s	view,	the	production	of	commodities	is	the	result	of	 ‘efforts	and	sacrifices’,	namely	labour	and	abstinence	from	consumption.	This	is	the	real	cost.	The	measure	of	its	amount	is	expressed	by	the	money	expenses	of	production	needed	in	order	to	compensate	for	the	sacrifices,	and	thus	to	induce	labourers	to	work	and	capitalists	to	save.	This	monetary	quantification	of	the	cost	is	the	supply	price.	On	the	other	hand,	 the	marginal	utility	of	 the	commodity	 is	measured	by	 its	demand	price,	namely	the	amount	of	money	a	consumer	is	willing	to	pay.	The	equality	between	the	supply	price	and	the	demand	price	of	a	commodity	determines	its	equilibrium	price.	The	law	of	supply	and	demand	is	the	mechanism	that	tends	to	push	the	value	of	a	commodity	toward	its	equilibrium	level:		When	 […]	 the	 amount	 produced	 (in	 a	 unit	 of	 time)	 is	 such	 that	 the	 demand	price	 is	greater	 than	 the	 supply	 price,	 then	 sellers	 receive	more	 than	 is	 sufficient	 to	make	 it	worth	their	while	to	bring	goods	to	market	to	that	amount;	and	there	is	at	work	an	active	force	tending	to	increase	the	amount	brought	forward	for	sale.	On	the	other	hand,	when	the	amount	produced	is	such	that	the	demand	price	is	less	than	the	supply	price,	sellers	receive	less	than	is	sufficient	to	make	it	worth	their	while	to	bring	goods	to	market	on	that	scale;	so	that	those	who	were	just	on	the	margin	of	doubt	as	to	whether	to	go	on	producing	 are	 decided	 not	 to	 do	 so,	 and	 there	 is	 an	 active	 force	 at	work	 tending	 to	diminish	the	amount	brought	forward	for	sale.	When	the	demand	price	is	equal	to	the	supply	 price,	 the	 amount	 produced	 has	 no	 tendency	 either	 to	 be	 increased	 or	 to	 be	diminished;	it	is	in	equilibrium.	(Marshall	1920:	345)		Following	this	argument,	as	previously	mentioned,	both	the	cost	of	production	and	the	marginal	utility,	 in	 the	 form	of	 their	money	counterparts	‒	supply	and	demand	prices	‒	are	needed	 in	determining	the	price	of	each	commodity.	There	 is	no	ultimate	standard	of	value.	
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Sraffa,	however,	as	we	shall	see	in	the	next	section,	was	not	fully	convinced	about	the	general	validity	of	this	conclusion.			
4.	Sraffa	and	the	ultimate	standards	of	value		With	reference	to	Marshall’s	reasoning	that	we	have	very	briefly	summarized	in	the	previous	section,	Sraffa,	in	the	pre-lectures,	raised	two	objections.	The	first	is	essentially	very	close	to	the	position	he	had	already	expressed	in	the	articles	(Sraffa	1925	and	1926).	He	maintained	that	if	constant	returns	to	scale	are	assumed,	 then	the	cost	of	production	alone	can	be	seen	as	 the	ultimate	determinant	of	the	price:		The	belief	that,	since	it	is	the	equating	of	cost	and	utility	(Supply	and	Demand	prices)	that	determines	equilibrium,	neither	utility	nor	cost	can	be	said	to	be	determinant	of	price,	is	entirely	unfounded.	It	can	be	easily	shown	by	 the	diagram	of	 constant	 costs	 that	 in	 this	 case,	 although	at	 the	position	of	equilibrium	supply	price	and	demand	price	equate,	it	is	exclusively	the	former	that	determines	price.	The	equilibrium	price	is	 always	equal	both	 to	 supply	and	demand	prices,	but	 this	 is	not	sufficient	to	prove	that	both	of	the	latter	are	determinants.	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	29)		The	 second	 objection	 is,	 by	 contrast,	 new	 and	 closely	 connected	 to	 the	 arguments	presented	 in	 the	 previous	 two	 sections.	 According	 to	 Sraffa,	Marshall	 could	 avoid	 referring	value	to	an	ultimate	standard	thanks	to	his	partial	equilibrium	approach,	but	as	soon	as	we	try	to	extend	the	analysis	 to	 the	determination	of	the	value	of	many	commodities	 together,	 it	 is	necessary	to	refer	to	an	ultimate	standard	of	the	value.7	In	Sraffa’s	words:		If	we	are	inquiring	into	the	general	problem	of	the	causes	of	value,	it	is	no	use	for	us	to	argue	that	the	value	of	bread	is	determined	by	the	price	of	corn	and	by	the	money	wages	of	bakers,	that	the	price	of	corn	is	determined	by	the	money	wages	of	labourers	and	by	the	price	of	agricultural	implements,	that	the	money	wages	of	labourers	depend	upon	the	prices	of	foodstuffs,	and	so	on	ad	infinitum	‒	this	would	be	a	perfectly	futile	way	of	reasoning	 in	 a	 circle.	 In	 this	 general	 problem	we	must	 find	 some	ultimate	 standard,	independent	 from	 the	 variables	we	 are	 considering,	 such	 {as}	 utility	 or	 disutility	 or	labour.	But	if	we	confine	our	inquiry	to	such	a	question	as	that	of	how,	being	given	all	the	prices	 and	 amounts	 consumed	 and	 produced	 of	 all	 other	 commodities,	 what	 is	 the	mechanism	through	which	the	price	of	a	given	article	is	caused	to	be	what	it	is,	and	not	higher	or	lower:	or	how	an	increase	in	its	demand,	ceteris	paribus,	would	affect	its	price	‒	 the	 position	 is	 entirely	different:	 there	 is	 no	 objection	 to	our	measuring	 costs	 and																																																									7	As	regards	the	debates	about	the	‘ultimate	standard	of	value’	that	Sraffa	surely	had	in	mind,	cf.	Campus	(2000)	and	Trezzini	(2018b).	
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utilities	in	terms	of	money	‒	indeed	we	can	entirely	dispense	with	such	conceptions.	We	can	substitute	to	costs	of	production	the	much	simpler	«money	expenses	of	production»	and	to	marginal	utility	«marginal	demand	price».	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	17‒18)		Hence,	during	the	summer	of	1927,	Sraffa	was	becoming	aware	that	what	he	had	written	in	 the	 1925	 and	 1926	 articles	 about	 the	 recovery	 of	 the	 old	 standpoint	 of	 the	 classical	economists	was	not	really	correct.	It	is	not	by	a	horizontal	supply	curve	‒	or	by	the	assumption	of	constant	returns	to	scale,	which	is	the	same	‒	that	we	can	revive	Ricardo’s	view,	because	the	problem	 he	 wanted	 to	 solve	 was	 not	 that	 of	 the	 determination	 of	 the	 price	 of	 a	 single	commodity.	Ricardo	was	interested	in	determining	the	values	of	many	commodities	together	and	Marshall’s	argument,	grounded	on	supply	and	demand	prices,	cannot	be	adopted	in	this	case.	According	to	Sraffa,	outside	the	partial	equilibrium	approach,	supply	and	demand	prices	lead	to	‘reasoning	in	a	circle’.	Sraffa	started	to	believe	that	an	ultimate	standard	of	value	was	required	in	order	to	solve	the	problem.		{Marshall’s}	method	of	reasoning	 is	legitimate	only	 in	respect	of	one	commodity	at	a	time:	we	could	of	course	apply	it	in	succession	to	each	of	the	other	commodities	[…]	but	not	to	all	or	several	commodities	at	the	same	time.	We	 can	 therefore	 go	 without	 a	 conception	 of	 ultimate	 standard	 of	 value:	 our	standard	is	⎯	the	value	of	other	commodities:	and	this	can	be	done,	and	is	useful	so	far	as	we	want	to	inquire	into	the	internal	organization	of	an	industry	and	its	methods	of	marketing.	But	so	soon	as	we	want	to	analyse	how	the	general	equilibrium	is	reached	‒	i.e.	we	want	to	analyse	the	interactions	of	one	commodity	upon	the	other,	how	they	affect	each	other’s	 conditions	of	production	and	utilities,	and	how	 the	 remuneration	of	 common	factors	of	production	is	determined	‒	then	an	ultimate	standard	of	value	is	required.	We	can	no	more	refer	the	costs	and	utilities	of	one	article	to	the	costs	and	utilities	of	another	one	‒	in	this	case	this	would	beg	the	question,	and	we	would	be	reasoning	in	a	circle.	Two	standards	offered:	they	are	the	same	thing	⎯	words.	[…]		However	there	is	one	reality	in	cost,	i.e.	labour.	(Clay)	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	38‒39)		The	 ‘two	standards’	 Sraffa	 referred	 to	 in	 the	 final	 lines	 of	 this	passage	 are	 ‘marginal	utility’	and	Marshall’s	‘real	cost’	‒	i.e.	‘measurable	efforts	and	sacrifices’.	They	were	not	seen	by	Sraffa	 as	 a	 satisfactory	 solution,	 essentially	 for	 two	 reasons.	 First,	 they	 are	 ‘psychological’	magnitudes:	each	individual	can	be	the	sole	judge	of	her/his	own	willingness	to	pay,	work	and	save.	There	is	no	possibility	of	objective	measurement.	Second,	they	are	not	really	‘ultimate’	standards.	In	Sraffa’s	view	they	are	‘relative	conceptions’:	the	utility	or	the	disutility	(sacrifice)	of	a	certain	item	depends	on	the	alternatives	available.		
	 9	
Physical	real	costs	All	the	ultimate	standards	we	have	considered	up	to	this	point	are	psychological:	that	is	to	say	their	test	is	the	willingness	of	consumers	or	producers	to	make	a	sacrifice	in	order	to	obtain	a	utility	‒	or	vice	versa.	Real	costs	 interpreted	as	disutility	are	thus	strictly	dependent	upon	the	alternative	uses	to	which	they	can	be	put:	the	more	attractive	such	alternative	uses,	the	greater	the	disutility	incurred	in	giving	them	up.	But	this	is	still,	it	may	be	 said,	 a	 relative,	not	an	ultimate,	 conception.	The	disutility	of	one	 thing	 is	 the	utility	of	another	thing:	and	what	is	the	utility	of	the	latter?	⎯	it	is	tested	by	the	disutility	involved	 in	not	acquiring	a	 third	thing	⎯	and	so	on	ad	 infinitum	{…}.	So	 far	as	we	are	considering	the	utility	of	one	article	of	consumption	or	the	disutility	of	one	sort	of	labour	to	a	man	who	has	the	opportunity,	if	he	chooses,	to	take	up	an	alternative	employment,	the	test	is	satisfactory.	But	when	the	field	of	our	inquiry	is	extended,	it	soon	appears	that	the	 larger	 the	 «industry»,	 i.e.	 the	 number	 of	 commodities	 or	 of	 vocations,	which	we	propose	 to	 investigate	 simultaneously	 (and	 this	 is	 necessary	 if	 we	 recognize	 that	 a	considerable	degree	of	 interdependence	exists	between	 the	 conditions	governing	 the	production	and	the	consumption	of	the	most	diverse	commodities)	we	realize	that	the	number	 of	 “alternative"	 uses	 (commodities	or	 vocations)	 correspondingly	 decreases,	and	 the	 basis	 of	 our	 test	 grows	 thinner	 and	 thinner.	 What	 happens	 then	 if,	 as	 it	 is	necessary	in	a	quest	of	an	ultimate	standard,	we	go	so	far	as	to	consider	the	whole	of	the	commodities	produced	and	the	efforts	incurred	at	one	and	the	same	time?	shall	we	not	then	entirely	miss	any	alternative	use,	since	ex-hypothesi	we	have	included	them	all	into	our	consideration?	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	42‒43,	emphasis	in	the	original)		Sraffa’s	 reasoning	 can	 be	 summarized	 as	 follows.	 In	 order	 to	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	determining	the	value	of	all	commodities	at	once,	we	can	use	neither	the	supply	and	demand	prices	nor	the	standards	of	value	Marshall	set	behind	them,	namely	marginal	utility	and	real	cost.	Once	the	partial	equilibrium	approach	is	left	behind,	the	whole	of	Marshall's	theory	seems	to	have	crumbled	into	Sraffa’s	hands.	Yet,	he	writes,	there	is	something	real,	something	true,	behind	the	cost.	There	is	labour,	which	enters	all	productions,	and	from	here,	as	we	shall	see,	Sraffa	tried	to	start	again.			
5.	The	physical	real	cost		As	we	have	just	seen,	in	the	summer	of	1927,	Sraffa	thought	that	an	ultimate	standard	of	value	was	required	in	order	to	go	back	to	the	theory	of	value	of	the	classical	economists,	namely	a	theory	that	allows	the	determination	of	the	value	of	many	commodities	together,	and	so	to	use	it	within	the	surplus	approach	to	income	distribution.	Moreover,	he	realized	that	none	of	the	standards	Marshall	denoted	as	the	principles	behind	the	supply	and	the	demand	price	‒	i.e.	real	cost	 and	 marginal	 utility	 ‒	 was	 a	 convincing	 solution	 to	 the	 problem,	 since:	 i)	 they	 are	psychological;	ii)	they	are	not	ultimate	standards.	
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The	‘physical	real	cost’	appeared	to	be	the	right	solution.	This	was,	in	Sraffa’s	view,	the	notion	of	cost	of	Petty	and	the	Physiocrats,	who	understood	the	cost	of	a	certain	commodity	as	the	bundle	of	commodities	that	is	absolutely	necessary	to	enable	its	production.8	This	bundle	includes	mainly	the	workers’	subsistence,	but	also	other	means	of	production.	Being	absolutely	necessary,	the	amount	of	commodities	that	forms	the	physical	real	cost	can	 be	 observed	 and	 objectively	 measured.9	 In	 fact,	 whenever	 commodities	 are	 actually	produced,	the	physical	real	cost	must	be	there	because	the	employment	of	those	commodities	is	needed	to	enable	the	production	process.	With	reference	to	this	physical	real	cost,	Sraffa	saw	two	difficulties.	The	first	problem	concerned	 the	 substitutability	 among	 commodities	 in	 both	 production	 and	 consumption.	 If	there	 are	 alternative	 methods	 of	 production	 for	 the	 same	 commodity	 and/or	 there	 are	alternative	bundles	of	consumption	goods	the	workers	can	subsist	with,	then	there	is	more	than	one	set	of	commodities	that	represent	the	physical	real	cost:		Physical	Real	Costs	This	conception	would	be	tenable	only	if	all	the	commodities	considered	(or	at	least	one	of	 them)	 had,	 each	 of	 them,	 no	 possible	 substitute	 (and	 therefore	 were	 absolute	necessaries,	 since	 luxuries	 are	 natural	 substitutes	 amongst	 themselves).	 But	 if	commodities	have	substitutes,	there	is	no	more	“one”	real	cost	composed	of	a	series	of	various	quantities	of	commodities,	which	don’t	require	common	measure:	so	soon	as	there	 are	 substitutes,	 there	 is	 an	 infinite	 number	 of	 combinations	 of	 the	 different	commodities,	 which	 satisfy	 the	 condition	 of	 maintaining	 life	 and	 efficiency	 of	 the	producers.	How	are	we	to	choose	between	these	combinations?	It	is	of	course	impossible	to	choose	between	l	kg	of	bread	+	½	kg	of	meat	and	¼	kg	of	bread	+	l	kg	of	meat,	unless	we	 introduce	the	common	measure	of	 their	value	⎯	and	that	would	beg	the	question.	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	44,	emphasis	in	the	original)		And	in	the	left	margin	of	this	passage,	Sraffa	added:	‘But	in	a	community	that	produces	just	what	is	sufficient	to	keep	it	going,	would	there	not	be	only	one	combination	that	satisfies	the	above	condition?	It	would	be	«the	cheapest».’	Hence,	in	order	to	circumvent	the	first	difficulty,	Sraffa	wanted	to	introduce	a	‘common	measure’	 for	 the	 commodities	 that	 form	 the	 physical	 cost,	 in	 order	 to	 find	 out	 which	combination	 is	 the	 cheapest.	This	 is	 the	second	problem:	how	could	a	 set	of	heterogeneous	commodities	be	reduced	to	a	single	quantity?		
																																																								8	In	Sraffa’s	manuscripts	of	the	late	1920s,	we	can	find	his	reconstruction	of	the	history	of	the	‘degeneration’	of	the	notion	of	cost	‒	from	the	‘right	notion	of	cost’	of	Petty	and	the	Physiocrats	to	Marshall’s	real	cost.	For	a	survey	of	these	documents,	cf.	Fratini	(2018).	9	On	the	notion	of	physical	real	cost	that	Sraffa	referred	to	in	his	manuscripts,	cf.	also:	Garegnani	(2005);	Kurz	and	Salvadori	(2005)	and	Kurz	(2006).	
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The	two	problems,	in	Sraffa’s	view,	are	connected	between	themselves.	In	fact,	if	there	were	 no	 substitutability	 among	 the	 commodities,	 then	 Sraffa	 thought	 he	 could	 be	 found	 a	‘necessary	commodity’	with	which	all	the	commodities	are	directly	or	indirectly	produced,	so	as	to	measure	the	physical	cost	as	a	quantity	of	this	commodity.		It	should	be	remarked	that	if	this	difficulty	(of	no	substitutes)	were	overcome	and	an	absolutely	necessary	commodity	found,	the	difficulty	of	reducing	to	a	common	measure	the	various	things	entering	into	real	cost	would	solve	by	itself.	In	effect,	it	would	be	easy	to	find	the	cost	of	all	the	other	things	in	terms	of	the	necessary	one,	and	thus	by	going	back	enough	in	the	genealogy	of	production	(and	stopping	along	each	branch	so	soon	as	we	 have	 resolved	 it	 into	 our	 necessary	 commodity)	 we	might	 find	 exactly	 the	 total	amount	of	corn	(if	 this	were	the	 ideal	necessary	commodity,	which	 it	 is	not)	 that	has	actually	entered	 into	 the	production	of,	 say,	 this	book,	 and	covers	entirely	 its	 cost	of	production,	at	the	exclusion	of	any	other	commodity.	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	44‒45,	emphasis	in	the	original)		 As	Naldi	argued	in	a	recent	paper	(2018),	here	we	can	find	the	origin	of	the	path	that	led	Sraffa	to	his	price	equations.	Referring	to	‘a	community	that	produces	just	what	is	sufficient	to	keep	it	going’	‒	i.e.	to	a	‘subsistence	economy’	of	the	same	kind	as	the	one	Sraffa	considered	in	the	 first	 chapter	 of	 his	 book	 (Sraffa	 1960:	 3‒5)	 ‒	 the	 problem	 of	 substitutability	 between	bundles	of	commodities	that	can	represent	workers’	consumption	is	figured	out	by	assumption.	That	is	probably	the	reason	why	Sraffa	decided	to	focus	his	attention	primarily	on	economies	without	surplus.	Between	the	end	of	1927	and	the	beginning	of	1928,	Sraffa	discovered	his	‘first	equations’,	namely	the	system	whose	solution	determines	the	relative	prices	of	commodities	for	an	economy	without	surplus.	Moreover,	 once	 he	 had	 got	 the	 first	 equations,	 he	 realized	 that	 the	 reduction	 of	 the	physical	cost	to	a	necessary	commodity	was	not	really	needed.	The	physical	real	cost	of	each	commodity	could	directly	be	represented	as	the	set	of	different	commodities	employed	in	its	production.	Commodities	are	produced	by	means	of	commodities	and	the	latter	represent	their	physical	real	costs.	This	 idea	 of	 the	 physical	 real	 cost	 as	 the	means	 of	 production	 employed	 appears	 in	several	 passages	 of	 Sraffa’s	 manuscripts,	 written	 in	 different	 periods.	 We	 may	 quote,	 for	instance,	the	well-known	passage	titled	‘Man	from	the	moon’:		MAN	FROM	THE	MOON	{…}	if	a	man	fell	from	the	moon	on	the	earth,	and	noted	the	amount	of	things	consumed	in	each	factory	and	the	amount	produced	by	each	factory	during	a	year	he	could	deduce	at	 which	 values	 the	 commodities	 must	 be	 sold;	 {…}	 the	 conditions	 of	 exchange	 are	entirely	determined	by	the	conditions	of	production.	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/7:	87)	
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	And	a	very	similar	sentence	can	also	be	read	in	the	first	section	of	Production	of	Commodities	(Sraffa	1960),	where	Sraffa	‒	having	 introduced	the	methods	of	production	of	a	very	simple	subsistence	economy	‒	wrote	that	there	is	a	unique	set	of	exchange	values	that	is	compatible	with	the	repetition	of	the	production	process	and	‘such	values	spring	directly	from	the	methods	of	production’.10			
6.	The	physical	interpretation	of	Ricardo’s	theory	of	value	
	According	to	Sraffa,	notwithstanding	some	ambiguous	statements,	Ricardo’s	labour	theory	of	value	was	actually	based	on	the	physical	conception	of	the	cost	of	production.	In	Sraffa’s	view,	Ricardo	 adopted	 the	 quantity	 of	 labour	 embodied	 as	 a	 common	measure	 of	 the	 amount	 of	commodities	that	form	the	physical	real	cost.	The	starting	point	of	Sraffa’s	argument	is	a	problem	we	have	already	met:	that	of	the	substitutability	between	the	various	combinations	of	commodities	that	can	support	a	labourer	during	a	working	day.	He	said	that	the	difficulty	would	be	avoided	if	a	common	unit	of	measure	was	found	for	heterogeneous	commodities	In	particular,	he	wrote	that	the	best	measure	of	cost	available	is	the	amount	of	commodities	necessary	to	support	a	labourer	during	a	unit	of	labour	time	and,	if	several	of	such	sets	of	commodities	exist,	the	physical	cost	is	the	one	that	embodies	the	minimum	quantity	of	labour.		There	 is	however	something	to	be	said	 for	 this	conception	of	real	cost.	 It	 is	 true	that	there	 is	 an	 infinite	 number	 of	 combinations	 of	 commodities	 which	 would	 be	 «the	minimum»	necessary	 to	support	permanently	a	 labourer	working	8	hours	a	day	at	 a	given	standard	of	efficiency.	But	this	difficulty	arises	only	in	so	far	as	we	abstain	from	using	a	unit	of	measure	for	the	different	commodities,	and	simply	say	that	the	real	cost	of	producing	a	given	article	is	a	given	set	of	diverse	commodities	‒	and	this	would	be	an	«ultimate»	conception	if	there	were	no	possible	substitutes	for	those	commodities.	This	not	being	the	case,	we	must	find	a	unit	of	measure	for	cost:	the	necessity	for	this	unit	arises,	not	from	a	desire	of	actually	measuring	‒	it	is	prior	to	it,	and	is	required	even	 for	 thinking	 of	 cost.	 The	 best	 measure	 available	 is	 the	 amount	 of	 various	commodities	that	is	required	to	support,	during	an	hour,	a	common	average	labourer:	if																																																									10	As	is	known,	Sraffa	started	his	book	with	the	case	of	a	subsistence	economy	with	just	two	commodities:	wheat	and	iron.	The	methods	of	production	are	the	following:	 ‘280	quarters	of	wheat	and	12	tons	of	 iron	are	used	to	produce	400	quarters	of	wheat;	while	120	quarters	of	wheat	and	8	tons	of	iron	are	used	to	produce	20	tons	of	iron’	(Sraffa	1960:	3).	In	this	economy	there	is	no	surplus	since	the	amount	of	means	of	production	employed	‒	i.e.	280+120	qr.	wheat	and	12+8	t.	 iron	‒	equals	the	total	(gross)	output.	At	the	end	of	each	production	cycle,	the	producers	in	the	wheat	industry	must	purchase	12	t.	iron	from	the	producers	in	the	iron	industry	and	the	latter	must	purchase	120	qr.	wheat	from	the	former.	Therefore	120	qr.	wheat	are	exchanged	for	12	t.	iron,	namely:	the	relative	price	of	1	t.	iron	is	10	qr.	wheat.	
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there	are	many	of	such	sets	of	commodities,	we	can	choose	the	one	that	can	be	produced	with	a	minimum	of	labour	(this	is	ambiguous!).	Of	course,	not	all	individuals	in	one	trade	require	 the	 same	 amount	 of	 necessaries,	 and	 persons	 in	 different	 trades	 require	different	 amounts	 ‒	 and	 to	 this	 extent	 our	measurement	 is	 inexact,	 and	 real	 cost	 is	slightly	different	(in	excess	or	deficiency)	 from	number	of	hours	of	 labour.	 I	contend	however	that	 the	amount	of	necessaries	varies	much	less	between	different	workers,	than	vary	a)	their	disutilities,	b)	their	wages.	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	45‒46)		 Therefore,	the	quantity	of	labour	embodied	in	commodities	is	recovered	by	Sraffa	as	a	possible	 (approximate)	 measure	 of	 the	 physical	 real	 cost.	 This	 paved	 the	 way	 to	 the	interpretation	of	Ricardo’s	theory	of	value	in	terms	different	from	those	based	on	Marshall’s	supply	and	demand.	Ricardo’s	theory	was	not	based	on	Marshall’s	psychological	notion	of	cost	‒	i.e.	‘efforts	and	sacrifices’	‒	it	was	grounded	on	a	physical	notion	of	cost.		Thus	to	Ricardo’s	T{heory	of}	V{alue},	based	on	amount	of	labour,	two	interpretations	can	be	given:	1)	 the	 subjective	 (psycholog{ical}),	disutility	one,	2)	 the	objective	 (physical),	necessaries	of	existence	one.	He	probably	had	not	always	clear	in	mind	the	distinction,	but	I	believe	that	the	latter	is	the	one	that	underlies	his	T{heory	of}	V{alue}.	{…}	The	striking	insistence	of	Ricardo	in	affirming	that	quantity	of	labour,	and	not	the	wages	received	by	labour	(the	quantity	of	labour	required	to	produce	a	commodity,	not	the	 quantity	 of	 commodities	 commanded	 by	 labour)	 shows	 that	 the	 physical	interpretation	is	right.	For,	in	addition	to	real	costs,	the	labourer	receives	a	part	of	the	surplus	as	part	of	his	wages,	and	therefore	wages	and	cost	(labour)	are	different;	but	in	a	perfectly	 competitive	 system,	 wages	 would	 be	 proportional	 to	 marginal	 disutility	 of	labour.	Therefore,	if	the	physical	interpretation	of	real	cost	is	accepted,	quantity	of	labour	is	the	best	measure	of	cost;	if	the	disutility	interpretation	is	accepted,	wages	are	the	best	measure	 of	 cost.	 A	 large	 part	 of	 Ricardo's	 Chap{ter}	 on	Value	 is	 given	 to	 {prove}	 this.	Sect{ion}	1	of	Ch{apter}	1	is	by	himself	headed	with	this	summary	statement:	«The	value	of	a	commodity	...	depends	on	the	relative	quantity	of	labour	which	is	necessary	for	its	production,	and	not	on	the	greater	or	less	compensation	which	is	paid	for	that	labour».11	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/3:	47‒48)		In	the	final	part	of	this	passage	Sraffa	seems	to	maintain	that	Ricardo’s	reference	to	quantities	of	labour	embodied,	rather	than	to	amounts	of	wages	paid,	proves	that	he	was	trying	to	measure	the	cost	of	production	in	terms	of	workers’	subsistence.	The	validity	of	this	point	does	not	seem	certain,	however,	since	the	relative	quantity	of	labour,	to	which	Ricardo	actually	referred,	seems	suitable	 for	measuring	 both	 the	 relative	 quantity	 of	workers’	 subsistence	 necessary	 for	 the	production	of	the	commodities	and	the	relative	amount	of	wages	paid.			
																																																								11	Cf.:	Works,	vol.	I:	11.	
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7.	Conclusion		At	 the	very	beginning	of	 the	Preface	of	his	book	‒	 introducing	his	 theory	of	 value	 in	which	commodity	 prices	 depend	 on	 their	methods	 of	 production	 and,	 therefore,	 on	 their	physical	costs	‒	Sraffa	wrote:		Anyone	accustomed	to	think	in	terms	of	the	equilibrium	of	demand	and	supply	may	be	inclined,	 on	 reading	 these	 pages,	 to	 suppose	 that	 the	 argument	 rests	 on	 a	 tacit	assumption	of	constant	returns	in	all	industries.	If	such	a	supposition	is	founded	helpful,	there	is	no	harm	in	the	reader’s	adopting	it	as	a	temporary	working	hypothesis.	In	fact,	however,	no	such	assumption	is	made.	No	change	in	output	and	[…]	no	change	in	the	proportions	 in	 which	 different	 means	 of	 production	 are	 used	 by	 an	 industry	 is	considered,	so	that	no	question	arises	as	to	the	variation	or	constancy	of	returns.	(Sraffa	1960:	v)		And	on	the	following	page	he	added:		The	 temptation	 to	 presuppose	 constant	 returns	 is	 not	 entirely	 fanciful.	 It	 was	experienced	by	the	author	himself	when	he	started	on	these	studies	many	years	ago—and	it	led	him	in	1925	into	an	attempt	to	argue	that	only	the	case	of	constant	returns	was	generally	consistent	with	the	premises	of	economic	theory.	(Sraffa	1960:	vi)		Actually,	these	passages	can	be	seen	as	the	synthesis	of	the	results	achieved	by	Sraffa	through	the	reasoning	that	we	have	tried	to	reconstruct	here.	In	the	articles	of	1925	and	1926,	Sraffa	himself	was	‘accustomed	to	think	in	terms	of	the	equilibrium	 of	 demand	 and	 supply’	 and,	 accordingly,	 experienced	 ‘the	 temptation	 to	presuppose	constant	returns’.	He	maintained	that	the	hypothesis	of	constant	returns	to	scale	‒	which	he	claimed	to	be	the	only	case	 ‘generally	consistent	with	the	premises	of	[Marshall’s]	economic	 theory’	 ‒	 made	 it	 possible	 to	 recover	 the	 standpoint	 of	 the	 classical	 economists	according	 to	which	 commodity	 values	 depend	 on	 their	 costs	 of	 production.	 This	 claim	‒	 as	argued	 by	 Garegnani	 (2005)	 ‒	 was	 in	 fact	 grounded	 on	 a	Marshallian	 supply-and-demand	equilibrium	in	which,	however,	the	supply	curve	is	horizontal	due	to	the	assumption	of	constant	costs.	 Then,	during	the	summer	of	1927,	Sraffa	realized	he	could	not	use	Marshall’s	supply-and-demand	 equilibrium	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 representing	 the	 theory	 of	 value	 of	 the	 classical	economists.	As	we	have	shown,	in	the	pre-lectures,	Sraffa	stressed	that	Ricardo	developed	his	theory	of	value	in	order	to	study	the	distribution	of	the	national	income	among	social	classes.	He	was	interested	in	the	value	of	large	aggregates	of	commodities:	national	product,	necessary	consumption,	surplus.	By	contrast,	Marshall’s	theory	was	aimed	at	determining	the	price	of	a	
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single	commodity,	considering	all	the	other	prices	and	quantities	as	already	fixed.	Accordingly,	Sraffa	saw	that	Marshall’s	theory	was	not	suited	to	solving	Ricardo’s	problem.	Through	 his	 law	 of	 supply	 and	 demand,	 Marshall	 had	 tried	 to	 bring	 together	 two	opposing	and	alternative	views	about	the	determinants	of	the	value	of	commodity:	the	cost	of	production	principle	and	the	marginal	utility	principle.	In	Marshall’s	approach,	none	of	them	is	an	 ultimate	 determinant	 of	 value.	 Cost	 and	 utility,	 expressed	 in	money	 terms,	 become	 the	supply	and	the	demand	price,	respectively.	Thus,	the	equilibrium	price	is	determined	by	the	equality	of	supply	and	demand	price.	According	 to	 Sraffa,	 ‘[t]his	method	 of	 reasoning	 is	 legitimate	 only	 in	 respect	 of	 one	commodity	at	a	time:	we	could	of	course	apply	it	in	succession	to	each	of	the	other	commodities	[…]	 but	 not	 to	 all	 or	 several	 commodities	 at	 the	 same	 time’	 (Sraffa	 papers:	 D3/12/3:	 38).	Therefore,	it	cannot	be	adopted	for	determining	the	value	of	large	aggregates	of	commodities	‒	which	was	 the	goal	of	Ricardo’s	 theory	of	 value.	But	once	Sraffa	had	 left	behind	 the	partial	equilibrium	approach,	he	felt	the	need	to	refer	commodity	value	to	an	ultimate	standard.	Hence,	he	discovered	(or	rediscovered)	the	physical	real	cost,	understood	as	the	commodities	that	are	necessary	to	enable	production.	This	was	the	first	step	Sraffa	took	on	the	path	that	led	him,	in	a	few	months,	to	the	price	equations.	 By	 the	 equations,	 Sraffa	 realized	 that	 ‘the	 conditions	 of	 exchange	 are	 entirely	determined	by	the	conditions	of	production’	(Sraffa	papers:	D3/12/7:	87)	or,	which	is	the	same,	that	 ‘values	 spring	directly	 from	 the	methods	of	production’	 (Sraffa,	1960:	3).	And	 this	was	achieved	independently	of	any	assumption	about	returns	to	scale.	In	other	words,	Sraffa	was	able	to	recover	the	standpoint	of	the	old	classical	economists,	without	the	need	for	assuming	constant	returns	to	scale	and,	in	fact,	‘no	such	assumption	is	made’	in	his	book.			
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